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INTRODUCTION

Look around your home and think of all the possible ways a
visiting three-year-old child could possibly injure himself: those
uncovered outlets, that sparkling clean glass door, the hot mug of
coffee on the table, and that unsecured bookshelf. Then ask
yourself this: in deciding how far to go in protecting your child
guest from these dangers, would the fact that the three-year-old’s
mother is right next to him affect your decision in any way?
For the Minnesota Supreme Court, the answer is “no”—at least
1
according to its opinion in Foss v. Kincade.
Foss involved a three-year-old child who was injured when he
tried to climb an empty, unsecured bookcase in a family friend’s
2
home. The boy’s mother was around the corner, just a few feet
3
away, when the accident occurred. The Minnesota Supreme Court
specifically rejected the court of appeals’ argument that the
homeowners had no duty to protect the child due to the mother’s
4
presence. Instead, the supreme court held that the homeowners
had no duty to protect the child from the bookcase because it was
clearly not reasonably foreseeable that any guest would try to climb
5
it.
1. Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009).
2. Id. at 319.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 322.
5. Id. The court also held that discovery sanctions against the Kincades for
disposing of the bookcase before trial were inappropriate, because the Kincades
had already admitted that they knew it was possible the bookcase could tip over.
Id. at 323–24.
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Foreseeability is a question for the jury, we are told, unless the
6
issue “is clear.” So where a three-year-old child is left unsupervised
in a room with a big, empty bookcase sitting on a carpeted floor,
the issue “is clear.” Even where the homeowner is well acquainted
with the child and has characterized him as being very active, the
issue “is clear.” On the homeowner’s motion for summary
judgment—where all facts and inferences must be taken in the
light most favorable to the child—the issue “is clear.” And even
when the senior justice of the state’s highest court believes it was
reasonably foreseeable that the accident may occur, the issue, still,
“is clear.”
The only thing that is actually clear, in a more proper sense of
the word, is that the Minnesota Supreme Court—for one reason or
another—absolutely did not want this case to go in front of a jury.
Courts have frequently used the term “reasonable
foreseeability” in the context of duty, just as the Minnesota
Supreme Court did here, to take questions of fact away from the
jury. This has been recognized by legal scholars for some time, and
is one of the main reasons the American Law Institute (“ALI”)
specifically rejected no-duty rulings based on foreseeability in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts (“Third Restatement”). When cases
are decided by judges, as opposed to when they are decided by
7
juries, precedent is created. The case becomes law, dictating how
future cases are to be decided. When judges create precedent on
the basis of the undefined concept of foreseeability, they create
8
easily misunderstood and totally unpredictable laws. More people
test their luck in the courts, dockets begin to overflow, and judges
feel increasing pressure to quickly dismiss cases based on the catchall concept of foreseeability.
This article examines Foss v. Kincade and how it exemplifies the
pitfalls of using foreseeability as a basis for determining duty. The
history section covers the changes proposed in the Third
Restatement, followed by an account of premises liability in
Minnesota, with a particular focus on the duty owed to child
6. Id. at 322–23.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 8 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“A jury decision on the negligence issue is not
a precedent for later cases involving different parties and is not even admissible in
such later cases as a possible guide to later juries.”).
8. See generally William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for
Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 349 (1993) (arguing that the creation of
precedent based on foreseeability creates unpredictable laws).
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entrants. The following section gives an in-depth look at the facts
of Foss v. Kincade, and recounts the reasoning of the courts at each
level. The analysis section will look at the successes and failures of
the supreme court’s decision, and its implications for future cases.
Ultimately, this article will show why Minnesota courts should cease
their use of foreseeability as a consideration in the duty element of
negligence.
II. HISTORY
A. The Third Restatement of Torts on Duty and Foreseeability
The ALI takes a remarkable departure from its previous stance
on duty in the Third Restatement. In both the First and Second
Restatements, foreseeability was used for determining the existence
9
of a duty. This was the view expressed by Judge Cordozo in
10
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co, where he famously stated, “The
11
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”
Cordozo’s view was adopted by the First Restatement of Torts soon
12
after the Palsgraf decision, and was subsequently adopted by many
13
states, including Minnesota, which still adheres to the view today.
9. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 281 (1965); Hardie, supra note 8, at 394–95 (explaining that while the
Restatement (First) of Torts implied an event was foreseeable if there was “an
appreciable chance” of its occurrence, the Restatement (Second) of Torts failed to
quantify foreseeability at all, because such a definition would limit the court’s
broad use of the term).
10. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
11. Id. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
12. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953). In Palsgraf
Revisited, Prosser points out that it was more accurately the drafters of the First
Restatement who influenced Judge Cardozo’s opinion, rather than the other way
around. Cardozo was an advisor to the Restatement and had already heard the
drafters’ debate the lower New York court’s holding in Palsgraf. Id. at 4. When the
case was appealed to New York’s highest court, Cordozo applied the view that had
been argued by the majority of the Restatement drafters. Id. at 5. Soon after, the
Restatement adopted the view expressed by Cordozo in Palsgraf, and even uses the
facts of Palsgraf for one of its illustrations. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281
cmt. g, illus. 3 (1936). “It is not likely that any other case in all history ever
elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner.” Prosser, supra, at
8.
13. Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 381, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664
(1959) (“‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension.’” (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162
N.E. 99, 100 (1928))).
OF
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In contrast, the Third Restatement completely rejects any use
of foreseeability in the determination of duty. The proposed final
draft of section seven, subpart (a), reads: “[a]n actor ordinarily has
a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates
14
a risk of physical harm.” As clarified in the comments, this means
that a duty is assumed to exist in the vast majority of cases, and the
15
determination of liability should start with breach. Subpart (b)
states that no-duty rulings are only appropriate in “exceptional
cases,” where “articulated principle or policy” supports limiting
16
liability for a particular class of actors. The comments and notes
following section seven make it explicitly clear that “foreseeability
has no role under this Section and Restatement in a determination
17
that a duty exists vel non.”
1.

Problems with Duty Defined by Foreseeability

In explanation of its departure, the comments to section
seven point to the myriad problems created by using foreseeability
as a part of the duty determination. The comments cite the works
18
of many legal scholars who have shared similar concerns. These
concerns essentially go to three main problems with foreseeabilitybased no-duty rulings.
First, by dismissing cases based on the lack of foreseeability,
judges pass on issues of fact that are more appropriately decided by
19
the jury. Foreseeability is a particularly fact-intensive, case-by-case
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7(a) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
15. Id. at cmt. a; id. at reporters’ note cmt. b.
16. Id. at (b).
17. Id. at reporters’ note cmt. i. Although the position of the Third
Restatement contradicts the prior restatements, it is not new in itself. Judge
Andrews expressed a similar view in his dissenting opinion to Palsgraf—except
Andrews believed that foreseeability should be used to determine proximate
cause, while the Third Restatement argues predominantly that it should be used to
consider breach. Id.; see also Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. 339, 347–56, 162 N.E. 99, 101–05.
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 reporters’ note
cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (citing Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer
on the Patterns of Negligence, 15 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (1993); Patrick J. Kelley,
Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and
the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2001)).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmts. i–j
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (explaining that foreseeability is a question for
the jury whenever reasonable minds can differ and that judges should not
substitute no duty determinations for the evaluation of the jury); John C.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in
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determination, and small changes in the facts can have a profound
20
Plaintiffs are
affect on what is, or is not, deemed foreseeable.
short-changed when judges decide the determinative issue of
foreseeability on the basis of a thin fact record in the preliminary
stages of the case. In addition, by deciding foreseeability in the
context of duty, judges essentially are deciding no breach, but
without the no-reasonable-jury standard required for no breach
21
limiting their discretion.
Second, basing no-duty rulings on an indeterminate concept
like foreseeability creates terrible precedent and undermines the
22
legitimacy of the law. Foreseeability is so open-ended that judges
may use it to justify almost any ruling. It provides an easy escape by
Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 713 (2001) (“[T]he court is using the duty
element as a platform on which it may stand in order to decide for itself the
unreasonableness or breach issue, and thus surreptitiously to shrink the scope of
the rule stating that the breach issue is ordinarily for the jury.”); 3 FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 18.8 (3d ed. 2007)
(“Reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very prototype of the question a jury
must pass on in particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.”).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (explaining that small changes in facts can have a
dramatic effect on how much risk is foreseeable); John H. Marks, The Limit to
Premises Liability for Harms Caused by “Known or Obvious” Dangers: Will it Trip and Fall
Over the Duty-Breach Framework Emerging in the Restatement (Third) of Torts?, 38 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1, 62 (2005) (“[S]mall differences in facts can unquantifiably alter
the interaction of [the variables used to measure foreseeability] from one case to
the next. The subtle, case-specific interaction of these variables is thus typically
‘for the jury to take into account in evaluating whether the [defendant] was
unreasonable.’” (citations omitted)).
21. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 741 (2005)
[hereinafter Purging Foreseeability] (“[B]y resolving duty based on analysis of
whether the risk created by a defendant’s conduct was foreseeable, judges are
really deciding whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable—the essence of a
jury’s determination of breach.”); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 715 (“[C]ourts
sometimes trade on their authority to decide the obligation question in a manner
that takes breach questions away from the jury even when the summary
judgment/j.n.o.v. standard is not met.”).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (explaining that no-duty holdings are purely legal
determinations that liability should not be imposed, and that such rulings “should
be articulated directly without obscuring references to foreseeability.”). See also
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA L. REV. 1509,
1523 (1993) (“[J]udges should not rely on, or hide behind, words like . . .
foreseeable, unforeseeable . . . and whatever other magic mumbo jumbo courts
could use to obfuscate the policies that were really at the heart of their
decisions.”); Hardie, supra note 8, at 402 (“Using foreseeability in a flexible, caseby-case analysis creates uncertainty by giving courts the power and method to
decide cases without external restraint.”).
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allowing judges to dispose of complex legal questions without even
23
The
having to provide a single legal reason for doing so.
precedent created by such rulings is often so vague that that it
24
Often these
provides little, if any, guidance for later cases.
holdings are interpreted as being much broader than the court
25
intended, causing future injustice that goes relatively unnoticed.
Third, case-specific, no-duty rulings based on the lack of
26
Courts will
foreseeability confuse the obligation sense of duty.
proclaim that each person has a duty to exercise reasonable care,
but in the same breath, question whether the defendant owed a
27
duty in that particular case. Narrow, foreseeability based no-duty
rulings that do not apply to broad categories of cases, but rather
only to one very narrow set of facts, undermine the concept that
every person has a duty to exercise reasonable care.
Removing foreseeability from the duty determination will force
judges either to articulate the policies behind their no-duty rulings,
or adhere to the no-reasonable-jury standard by dismissing cases as
23. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 923
(2005) (explaining that no-duty rulings based on the lack of foreseeability are
popular with judges because they provide an easy, yet imperfect, solution to
complex legal dilemmas); Hardie, supra note 8, at 410 (“Application of the
foreseeability test has become addictive because it seems to solve complex
problems with apparent simplicity.”).
24. W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671,
723 (2008) (“[F]oreseeability is a particularly fact-dependent determination, not
properly given the broad effect of precedent. . . . Indeed, such fact-specific duty
rulings have even drawn the ire of Cardozo.” (comparing Balt. & Ohio R.R. v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 20 (1927) with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Cp., 292 U.S. 98,
101–02 (1934))).
25. Purging Foreseeability, supra note 21, at 793 (“And what if foreseeability
hides irrational or even prejudicial reasons for deciding tort liability? Because the
power of foreseeability, when used in the context of duty, is so broad and so
erratically defined, such injustices may go unnoticed and unchecked.”); Frank F.
Vandall, Duty: The Continuing Vitality of Dean Green’s Theory, 15 Q.L.R. 343, 345
(1995) (“The problem with such an overuse of foreseeability is that the judge may
get confused and make a bad decision. More importantly, the attorney may, in
using the word foreseeability, fail to realize the important policy factors that the
judge considers in making a decision.”).
26. Goldberg, supra note 19, at 716–17 (“[J]udicial decisions referring to
matter-of-law decisions as ‘duty’ decisions necessarily confuse the distinct issue of
duty in its obligation sense with the breach issue. And this confusion imposes a
cost not only on legal academics and students, but also on lawyers and judges
trying to litigate and resolve negligence cases.”).
27. E.g., Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, Div. of SCM Corp., 562 N.E.2d 967, 968,
970 (1990) (explaining that “every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all
others . . . ,” but holding, after a lengthy analysis of foreseeability, among other
factors, that the defendant owed no duty).
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a matter of law on the basis of no-breach. Precedent will be far
more coherent, leading to greater stability and predictability in the
law. And of course, judges and professors will no longer need to
keep their fingers crossed behind their backs when they say that
there is a universal duty on the part of every person to exercise
reasonable care.
B. Premises Liability in Minnesota
Landowner liability cases make up one of the largest
28
subcategories in negligence law. Historically, greater protection
was provided for the landowner’s right to use his land freely than
29
As
for the entrant’s right to safety—but times have changed.
society became more urbanized and relationships grew more
complex, courts began to find landowners owed a greater duty to
prevent the dangerous conditions on their land from causing injury
30
The old common law approach to premises liability,
to others.
which limited landowner liability based on the categorical status of
the entrant, no longer reflected societal values. Courts attempted
to “fix” the categorical rules by creating various exceptions, but this
only led to greater confusion. Hence, many states opted to modify
or abolish the categorical approach all together.
The Minnesota Supreme Court did so in the 1972 decision of
31
Although this move intended to clarify and
Peterson v. Balach.
32
liberalize premises liability law, the effect, if any, was short lived.
Under post-Peterson law today, Judges still use the duty
determination to limit landowner liability however they see fit—just
without any categorical boundaries. In fact, when it comes to child
entrants, liability appears to be even more limited and confusing
than it had been under the categorical approach. Foreseeability—
and its close cousin, the obvious danger rule—are largely to blame
for this confusing inversion in Minnesota premises liability law.

28. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & BARBARA B. MCFARLAND, THE LAW OF PREMISES
LIABILITY § 1.1 (3d ed. 2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
32. For a history of Minnesota premises liability law focused on adult
entrants, see Mike Steenson, Peterson v. Balach, Obvious Dangers, and the Duty of
Possessors of Land in Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1281 (2008).
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Pre-Peterson Premises Liability in Minnesota

Prior to 1972, a landowner’s duty to an entrant on his land
depended on the entrant’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or
33
invitee.
Invitees were owed the greatest duty, while trespassers
34
were owed the least—practically none at all.
35
Social guests were considered licensees, not invitees. Invitees
only included business visitors and members of the public on land
36
open to the public. While landowners had a duty of reasonable
37
care to keep their premises safe for invitees, landowners only had
a duty to warn social guests of unreasonable, yet non-obvious,
dangers. Landowners did not have to change or inspect their land
38
to make it safe for social guests. Social guests took the land as
39
they found it.
33. See id.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329, 330, 332 (1965). Section 329
defines “trespasser” as one who enters or remains on the land without the
landowner’s consent. Id. § 329. Section 330 defines “licensee” as one who enters
or remains on the land with the landowner’s consent. Id. § 330. Section 332
defines “invitee” as a member of the public upon land open to the public, or a
business visitor invited on the land for reason directly or indirectly to do with
business dealings with the landowner. Id. § 332. In addition, landowners owe all
entrants a duty to refrain from willful or wanton injury. Id. §§ 329–32.
35. Id. § 330, cmt. h3. Explaining this categorization of social guests, the
Restatement (Second) states:
Some confusion has resulted from the fact that, although a social guest
normally is invited, and even urged to come, he is not an “invitee,” within
the legal meaning of that term . . . . The explanation usually given by the
courts for the classification of social guests as licensees is that there is a
common understanding that the guest . . . does not expect and is not
entitled to expect that . . . precautions will be taken for his safety, in any
manner in which the possessor does not prepare or take precautions for
his own safety, or that of the members of his family.
Id.
36. Id. § 332.
37. E.g., Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W.2d 892
(1954) (holding that the duty of reasonable care owed to invitees included
repairing known dangerous conditions and making reasonable inspections to find
and repair previously unknown dangerous conditions; however, the duty did not
require landowners to warn invitees about obvious dangers, unless the landowner
had reason to believe the invitee would not recognize the danger despite the
obviousness).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342, cmt. d (1965) (“A possessor of
land owes to a licensee no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee’s reception
or to inspect the land to discover possible or even probable dangers.”).
39. Roadman v. C.E. Johnson Motor Sales, 210 Minn. 59, 64, 297 N.W. 166,
169 (1941) (“The general rule is that a mere licensee, like the trespasser, must
take the premises as he finds them.”).
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The status of an entrant was the determinative factor in the
40
Judges applied these categorical
judge’s decision on duty.
41
statuses very rigidly, often leading to arbitrary and unfair results.
Hence, courts began to develop a variety of different exceptions to
42
temper the basic rules. One of these exceptions was the notorious
“open and obvious danger” rule, announced in section 343A of the
43
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Minnesota adopted this rule in
44
1966.
As a result of these various exceptions, landowner liability
became a patchwork of limited duties and exceptions to those
45
duties, generating extreme confusion. The Minnesota Supreme
Court noted this as early as 1941 in Roadman v. C.E. Johnson Motor
46
Sales. Despite the confusion, however, the court explained, “we
think this general principle may be gathered, that ‘the greater the
chance of injury, the greater the precautions which must be taken
47
to prevent it.’”

40. WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supra note 28, § 6.1 (discussing the general
dissatisfaction with the common law categories).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads “A possessor of
land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965) (emphasis added). The
ambiguity of this rule has caused a great deal of frustration. The rule can be
interpreted as meaning a duty only exists when harm can be anticipated despite
the obviousness; but it can also be interpreted as meaning there is no breach of
duty unless harm can be anticipated despite the obviousness. John H. Marks, The
Limit to Premises Liability for Harms Caused by “Known or Obvious” Dangers: Will it Trip
and Fall Over the Duty-Breach Framework Emerging in the Restatement (Third) of Torts?,
38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 4 (2005). The effect of the former interpretation is to
make the obviousness of the danger a threshold question decided by the judge,
while the effect of the later interpretation is to essentially make the rule an
instruction to the jury. Id. at 34. For a discussion of the interpretation of this rule
and the effect of the Third Restatement upon it, see id.
44. Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 496–97, 144 N.W.2d 555,
557 (1966) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965)).
45. Comment, Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All
Entrants—”Invitee,” “Licensee,” and “Trespasser” Distinctions Abolished: Rowland v.
Christian, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 426, 427 (1969) (calling the categorical approach, as
modified by the various subcategories and exceptions, a “patchwork of legal
classifications, by no means uniformly interpreted by the various jurisdictions.”).
46. 210 Minn. 59, 297 N.W. 166 (1941).
47. Id. at 64, 267 N.W. at 169.
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Child Entrants Pre-Peterson

Even before Peterson, the duty owed to child entrants did not
depend on the status of the child. All children were subject to the
same standard of care—the child trespasser standard—which in
48
practice was the equivalent of reasonable care.
The child trespasser standard was articulated by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in its 1935 decision of Gimmestad v. Rose
49
50
Bros. Often referred to as the “attractive nuisance doctrine,” the
theory laid out the minimum elements a trespassing child needed
51
to meet in order to recover. These elements generally accounted
for children’s propensity to intermeddle and lower capacity to
52
recognize and appreciate harm.
48. E.g., Leon Green, Landowners’ Responsibility to Children, 27 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1948) (discussing how the attractive nuisance doctrine evolved into a duty of
reasonable care owed to all child entrants, and correctly hypothesizing that the
complexities of society would lead to the same standard of care being owed to
adult entrants).
49. 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935).
50. The name “attractive nuisance doctrine” is a misnomer. The name
derived from an earlier version of the standard that required the child to have
been enticed onto the land by the condition that caused him harm. This
requirement was put forth by the early Minnesota case Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway Co. 21 Minn. 207 (1875), but later abandoned in Gimmestad, 194 Minn.
531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
339 cmt. b (1965) (explaining that a child no longer needs to be enticed onto the
land by an attractive condition in order to recover).
51. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 536–37, 261 N.W. at 196; see also infra note 52.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. b (1965). Section 339 lays
out the elements of the attractive nuisance doctrine as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason
to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the
risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children.
Id. Minnesota case law frequently cites Gimmestad as the case adopting section 339,
despite the fact that Gimmestad actually adopted the wording of the rule used in a
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However, Gimmestad also pointed out that:
It should be clear by now that the phrase ‘attractive
nuisance’ indicates no special departure or exception
from the ordinary run of negligence cases. It is but a
convenient phrase to designate one sort of case within the
ordinary rule that one is liable for injury resulting to
another from failure to exercise, for the protection of the
injured child, the degree of care commensurate with and
53
therefore demanded by the circumstances.
Other cases made it clear that the child trespasser standard
applied to all children, no matter whether the child was an invitee,
54
licensee, or trespasser.
In other words, all child entrants under the categorical
approach were owed the same standard of care as was owed in
ordinary cases of negligence—reasonable care under the
55
circumstances. In addition, when a child was in the vicinity, “a

tentative draft of the First Restatement. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W.
194, 196 (1935) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 209 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1929)). See also Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson Co., 338 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn.
1983) (explaining that the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 339 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in Gimmestad).
53. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196. See also Doren v. NW.
Baptist Hosp. Ass’n, 240 Minn. 181, 186, 60 N.W.2d 361, 365 (“This court has
discharded [sic] the distinction between ‘attractive nuisance’ cases and other
negligence cases.”); Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947)
(noting that the distinction between attractive nuisance cases and regular
negligence cases has been discarded).
54. Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 221, 89 N.W.2d 712, 717
(1958) (applying Restatement section 339 to child licensee, since licensees were
owed at least as much as trespassers, “and probably some more”); Meagher v. Hirt,
232 Minn. 336, 339, 45 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1951) (“Our previous decisions in cases
of this kind make it clear that this duty to exercise due care to eliminate
conditions on real property which are hazardous to children is the same . . .
whether the child is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.” (citing Gimmestad, 194
Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196 (1935))).
55. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194; Meagher, 232 Minn. 336, 45
N.W.2d 563. The Minnesota Supreme Court further explained this in Hocking v.
Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Railway Company:
We think [the Gimmestad rule] results in a more equitable division of
community interests and adopts a standard by which this court can
measure and determine the extent of the landowner’s liability. Since
particular facts more determinative than others constantly vary
predictions as to liability generally, the most that can be done in good
conscience by this court is to lay down a rule of law that in good
judgment and common sense will aid in determining what fact situation
comes within the presently adopted rule.
263 Minn. 483, 490, 117 N.W.2d 304, 309 (1962).
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degree of vigilance commensurate with the greater hazards created
by his presence [was] required of a person to measure up to the
56
standard of what the law requires as reasonable care.” Essentially,
then, child entrants were afforded a greater degree of care than
any other class of entrants.
57
For example, in Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, decided in 1964, the
supreme court affirmed a jury’s finding of negligence where a child
58
guest was seriously burned by hot coffee. The two-and-a-half yearold child had been “helping” set the table for dinner when he fell
off a chair and onto a coffee percolator’s cord, which had been
59
precariously strung across an empty area next to the chair. The
coffee percolator fell onto the child, spilling its scalding contents
60
The trial court had instructed the jury that the
upon him.
applicable standard of care was reasonable care, not the standard
61
owed to adult licensees.
The supreme court found there was no absence of actionable
negligence—meaning there was no breach of duty—as a matter of
62
law. The case had been properly submitted to, and decided by,
63
the jury. Although the court believed negligence could not be
based on “a duty of care inconsistent with accepted patterns of
64
behavior in the home,” the court found that the particular facts of
Jarmulowicz were enough to support the jury’s finding of
65
negligence.
Thus, the duty owed to child entrants under pre-Peterson
premises liability law was not limited, as it was with respect to adult
entrants, by the categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee. All
56. Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, 268 Minn. 280, 282, 128 N.W.2d 763, 764 (1964).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 281, 128 N.W.2d at 764.
60. Id.
61. Id. In declining to use the obviousness of the danger as a basis for
dismissing an action against such a young child, the court noted “[t]he words of
the [adult] instruction relating to the knowledge of the licensee and to the
possible efficacy of a warning are obviously inapplicable where the licensee, as
here, is only 2 1/2 years of age.” Id. at 281, 128 N.W.2d at 764.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 284, 128 N.W.2d at 765.
64. Id. at 282, 128 N.W.2d at 765.
65. Id. The characteristics supporting a finding of negligence included the
fact that the grandmother knew the percolator was full of hot coffee, that she knew
the grandson’s parents were in another part of the apartment, that she knew the cord was
near where the grandson was standing on a chair, and that the accident was easily
preventable. Id. at 283, 128 N.W.2d at 765.
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child entrants were owed the same child trespasser standard of
care, which was equivalent to the regular negligence standard of
reasonable care.
2.

Peterson v. Balach

In 1958, California became the first state to abolish the
categorical approach to premises liability in the seminal case of
66
The California Supreme Court opted
Rowland v. Christian.
instead to treat landowner liability under the principles of ordinary
67
negligence law.
In 1972, Minnesota abolished the distinction between licensees
68
and invitees in Peterson v. Balach. In explaining its decision, the
court noted how it had to continually “twist the rules in order to
69
arrive at a just result” and that tempering the rigid categories by
creating exceptions was hardly any better, “because it create[d] a
rigid system which [was] at the same time complex, confusing,
70
inequitable, and, paradoxically, nonuniform.”
The court held that from then on, the duty owed to all
licensees and invitees was “no more and no less than that of any
other alleged tortfeasor, and that duty is to use reasonable care for
the safety of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless
71
of the status of the individuals.” The court listed a number of
66. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
67. Id. at 568. Explaining its reasoning behind abolishing the common law
categories, the court stated:
A man’s life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law
nor a loss [sic] less worthy of compensation under the law because he has
come upon the land of another without permission or with permission
but without a business purpose. . . . The common law rules obscure
rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern
determination of the question of duty.
Id.
68. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). The court, however, retained the
trespasser category, noting that there is “good reason” for this distinction and
eliminating it would be a “drastic step.” Id. at 165, 199 N.W.2d at 642.
69. Id. at 168, 199 N.W.2d at 644.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647. The court further noted that
the status of the injured person might well be a factor which the
factfinders could consider. The principal issue, however, will not be “in
what category shall we place the injured person” but, rather, “did the
owner (or the person responsible) act as a reasonable person in view of
the probability of injury to persons entering upon the property” whether
they be licensees of [sic] invitees.
Id.
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factors that might be taken into account when determining
liability, which included “the circumstances under which the
entrant enters the land (licensee or invitee); foreseeability or
possibility of harm; duty to inspect, repair, or warn; reasonableness
of inspection or repair; and opportunity and ease of repair or
72
correction.”
Although some statements in Peterson may somewhat
ambiguously imply that the judge must make an initial
73
determination as to whether a duty exists at all, elsewhere in the
decision, as well as in cases decided soon after Peterson, it was
clarified that a duty exists solely in virtue of the landowner-entrant
74
The analysis of premises liability cases, then, was
relationship.
75
normally to start with breach.
3.

Post-Peterson Premises Liability in Minnesota

Peterson may have attempted to clarify premises liability law—
but this was hardly the result. Before Peterson, Minnesota courts
usually assumed the existence of a duty, and quickly went on to
discuss whether the landowner had breached his duty (or “was
76
negligent”). Likewise, just after Peterson, courts deciding premises
72. Id. at 175, 199 N.W.2d at 648.
73. The most ambiguous statement may have been the following: “After all
pertinent factors are considered, depending upon the circumstances of each case,
the factfinders will be asked to determine if liability exists for damages sustained
by an entrant.” Id. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 648. This statement does not say who
considers all of the pertinent factors, but other parts of the decision indicate it
meant the jury. See id. The indication of a subsequent determination as to liability
may refer to the jury’s determination on causation.
74. E.g. Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1979) (listing the
factors from Peterson as factors for determining whether the defendant met the
duty of reasonable care).
75. Id.
76. Landowner liability cases decided before Peterson tended to analyze cases
in terms of breach (“actionable negligence” or “negligence”), rather than in terms
of duty, indicating a duty was generally assumed to exist. E.g., Dempsey v.
Jaroscak, 290 Minn. 405, 188 N.W.2d 779 (1971) (reversing trial court’s finding of
no actionable negligence as a matter of law); Peterson v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 274
Minn. 495, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966) (upholding jury’s finding of negligence);
Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, 268 Minn. 280, 128 N.W.2d 763 (1964) (upholding jury’s
finding of negligence); Sandstrom v. AAD Temple Bldg. Ass’n, 267 Minn. 407, 127
N.W.2d 173 (1964) (affirming trial court’s finding of no negligence as a matter of
law); Behrendt v. Ahlstrand, 264 Minn. 10, 118 N.W.2d 27 (1962) (affirming jury’s
finding of negligence); Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d 252 (1957)
(finding no negligence as a matter of law); Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 22
N.W.2d 213 (1946) (upholding jury’s finding of negligence).
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liability cases continued to assume the existence of the landowner’s
77
duty to exercise reasonable care.
By the 1990s, however, the courts had begun to treat
landowners the same as “any other alleged tortfeasor” in
Minnesota—by initially launching a full scale inquiry into whether
78
the landowner owed any duty in the first place. The definitive
79
turning point in this metamorphosis was Barber v. Dill, decided by
80
Failing to even cite
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1995.
Peterson, the supreme court in Barber declared that the “[a]nalysis of
a cause of action against a landowner for negligence begins with an
inquiry into whether the landowner, Dill, owed the invitee, William
81
Barber, a duty.” By allowing for a distinct duty inquiry in every
case, Barber restored much of the gate-keeping power that judges
had lost after Peterson. In fact, because they were not even
restrained by the common law categories, Barber probably gave
judges even more gate-keeping power than they had under the
categorical approach. Unsurprisingly, Barber quickly became one
82
of the most cited cases in Minnesota premises liability law.
After Barber was decided, the main standard for determining
the existence of a duty on the part of a landowner became the
83
open and obvious danger rule—a close cousin of foreseeability.
77. Cases decided just after Peterson continued to determine liability on the
basis of breach of duty, assuming that a general duty of reasonable care existed on
the part of the landowner. E.g., Bisher v. Homart Dev. Co., 328 N.W.2d 731
(Minn. 1983) (holding no actionable negligence as a matter of law); Adee v.
Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1979) (holding that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that a store owner has no duty to warn a customer of risks
about which the customer had present knowledge and present realization);
Gaston v. Fazendin Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1978) (holding that
construction company had continuing duty to keep construction premises safe for
business visitors).
78. The view that landowner liability cases start with an inquiry into whether
any duty existed in the first place is the settled view of the Minnesota Supreme
Court today. Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995). See also Louis v.
Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2001) (holding that premises liability cases
start with an inquiry into whether the landowner owed the entrant a duty);
Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 1997) (holding landowner had no
duty to warn about obvious dangers).
79. 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995); see also Steenson, supra note 32, at
1304, 1316 (explaining the line of analysis in Minnesota premises liability cases
after Barber).
80. Barber, 531 N.W.2d at 495.
81. Id.
82. Steenson, supra note 32, at 1305.
83. Barber, 531 N.W.2d at 495. See also Marks, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that
the open and obvious danger rule was “historically premised on the
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In addition, the factors which Peterson had listed for determining
breach became factors for the judge to use when determining
84
Thus, the court’s initial inquiry into the duty now
duty.
considered: (1) whether the landowner owed the entrant a duty of
reasonable care, in light of the factors listed in Peterson; (2) whether
the danger was known or obvious to any person exercising ordinary
perception, intelligence, and judgment; (3) if the danger was
known or obvious, whether the landowner could foresee harm to
85
the entrant despite the obviousness.
Duty—which Peterson had intended to be practically a nonquestion—now swallows the majority of the analysis in premises
liability cases.
a.

Child Entrants Post-Peterson

Although there have only been a limited number of cases
involving child entrants decided since Peterson, it does not appear
that children have been immune to the curious gate-keeping frenzy
that adult entrants have been subjected to. For example, courts
have used the open and obvious danger rule to limit liability for
86
injuries to children, but generally only older children.
One notable limitation on liability to child entrants came in
87
Sirek v. State Department of Natural Resources, decided in 1993.
There, a young girl was hit by a van while crossing a freeway
88
adjoining a state park. Statutory immunity explicitly limited the
89
state’s duty to park entrants to the duty owed to trespassers. The
unforeseeability of any risk of harm . . . .”).
84. Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 319 n.4 (Minn. 2001) (citing Peterson v.
Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174 n.7, 199 N.W.2d 639, 648 n.7 (1972)) (“Other factors
to consider in assessing the duty owed include (1) the foreseeability or possibility
of harm; (2) the duty to inspect, repair, or warn; (3) the reasonableness of
inspection or repair; and (4) the opportunity and ease of repair or correction.”).
See also Steenson, supra note 32, at 1310 (noting that the court in Louis curiously
appears to make the factors listed in Peterson relevant to the duty determination,
rather than the breach determination).
85. For an even more detailed account of the principles governing premises
liability law in Minnesota after Barber, see Mike Steenson, Peterson v. Balach, Obvious
Dangers, and the Duty of Possessors of Land in Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1281 (2008).
86. E.g., Sperr v. Ramsey County, 429 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(denying recovery to an eleven-year-old child who was injured when he ran into a
low hanging tree due to the obviousness of the danger).
87. 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993).
88. Id. at 808.
89. Id. The relevant part of this statute reads:

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 9
14. Varda.doc

2009]

12/2/2009 4:53 PM

FOSS V. KINCADE

371

issue, then, was whether the child trespasser standard or the adult
90
trespasser standard applied to the child injured in Sirek.
The supreme court found that the adult trespasser standard
91
Because the park was only accessible by car, children
applied.
were not expected to be in the park unsupervised; and “[w]hen
small children are being watched by their parents, or entrusted
persons in supervision, landowners may be relieved of a duty to
warn them of or remove dangerous instrumentality [sic] the
92
danger from which is apparent;” and in addition, “if a child is too
young chronologically or mentally to be ‘at large,’ the duty to
supervise that child as to obvious risks lies primarily with the
93
Holding otherwise would be against
accompanying parent.”
public policy, the court explained, because it “would require the
‘childproofing’ of vast areas of state parks,” and thereby destroying
94
the parks’ naturalness.
95
In Johnson v. Washington County, the supreme court found
Sirek applicable to a child who drowned in a man-made swimming
pond in a county park, despite the fact children were known to be
96
at the pond unsupervised. The court found that Sirek still barred
the application of the child trespasser standard because the child in
Johnson was, in-fact, under the supervision of adults when the
97
accident occurred.
i. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Broad Use of Sirek v.
State Department of Natural Resources
The court of appeals read the holding in Sirek much more
Subd. 3. Exclusions. . . . the legislature declares that the state and its
employees are not liable for the following losses: . . .(h) a loss involving
or arising out of the use or operation of a recreational motor vehicle, as
defined in section 84.90, subdivision 1, within the right-of-way of a trunk
highway, as defined in section 160.02, except that the state is liable for conduct
that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person . . .
Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(h) (2009) (emphasis added).
90. Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 809.
91. Id. at 811.
92. Id. (quoting Strode v. Becker, 564 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
93. Id. (quoting Salinas v. Chicago Park Dist., 545 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989)).
94. Id. at 811.
95. 518 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 1994).
96. Id. The court found that the principle in Sirek also applied to county
parks, because “the immunity statutes are essentially identical and the policy
considerations are the same.” Id. at 599.
97. Id.
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broadly than the supreme court had intended it to be. The court
even stretched it so far as to support practically contradicting
holdings.
98
For example, in Bredvick ex rel. Bredvick v. City of Morris, the
court of appeals used Sirek to deny application of the child
trespasser standard where a child who was not accompanied by
99
adults drowned in a man-made swimming pond. The court noted
the outcome in Johnson, but found that because governmentemployed lifeguards had been on duty when the accident occurred,
100
the child trespasser standard was likewise inapplicable.
101
Yet, in Fear v. Independent School District 911, the court of
appeals found that the child trespasser standard did apply when a
child was injured while under the supervision of a government102
employed school teacher.
The court of appeals came up with a number of other curious
holdings using Sirek. In Habeck v. Ouverson, the court found the
child trespasser standard applied where a child was run over by a
tractor at a county fair, since the child’s parents were elsewhere on
the fairgrounds and were not actually supervising their child when
103
In Stiele ex rel. Gladieux v. City of Crystal,
the accident occurred.
98. No. C1-01-1110, 2002 WL 171713, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2002).
99. Id.
100. Id. As government employees, the lifeguards enjoyed discretionary
immunity for any accidents that occurred while performing their prescribed
duties. This created a wonderful loophole for the state: by simply employing
people to supervise, the state could relieve itself from any possible liability under
the child trespasser standard—no matter how well those employees carried out
their prescribed duties. See id.
101. 634 N.W.2d 204, 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
102. Id. at 214. The court of appeals explained the wonderfully circular
reasoning behind this decision as follows:
[T]he children were allowed to play on the snow piles during recess with
school district employees present, and therefore the children arguably
would not have realized the risk of injury involved. While there was
supervision during recess, similar to cases applying [the adult trespasser
standard], the facts of this case are more directly analogous to [the child
trespasser standard], the successor to the attractive nuisance doctrine.
We have children playing during recess on a playground that has snow
piles that attract their attention, and they are not prohibited from
playing on them. The supreme court has stated that school districts have
a duty of reasonable care to their students. Absent case law applying [the
adult trespasser standard] to school settings, we conclude that [the child
trespasser standard] is more appropriate and shall be applied at trial.
Id. (citation omitted). Liability was not dismissed in this case on the basis of
official immunity, due to insufficient evidence. Id. at 216.
103. 669 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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the court of appeals found the child trespasser standard did not
apply to a child injured in a city park, because any child allowed to
104
be “at large” was expected to recognize the danger in that case.
In Warman v. Gaber, the court found the child trespasser standard
inapplicable where a child guest was injured jumping on a family
friend’s trampoline, because the child’s mother was present when
105
All of these cases cited Sirek as the primary
the injury occurred.
support for their holdings.
The Minnesota Supreme Court had not intended Sirek to be
106
However, it had not corrected the court of
read so broadly.
appeals’ sporadic misuse of Sirek either—at least not until 2009.
III. FOSS V. KINCADE
A. Facts
On October 15, 2003, Peggy Foss went to visit the new home of
107
Accompanying Peggy was
her close friend, Stephanie Kincade.
her nine-year-old daughter and three-year-old son, David Foss, Jr.—
108
Peggy had
an active boy with a history of climbing furniture.
caught David climbing a bookcase in her home a few months
earlier, and she and her husband had to warn David not to climb
109
Stephanie knew about
furniture on many other occasions.
David’s activity level, and characterized him as even more active
110
than her own active young son.
The Kincades had just moved into their new home two weeks
111
Many rooms
earlier, and were still in the process of unpacking.

104. 646 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). The child was eleven-years
old, and was injured when he jumped off a fence onto a “three-to-four-foot tall
metal signpost.” Id. He appeared only to have suffered relatively minor injuries.
See id. at 253.
105. No. C3-01-1755, 2002 WL 453282, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002).
The court further found that the child trespasser standard was inapplicable
because the injured child’s family also had a trampoline, and the child and her
mother were well-aware of the dangers involved. Id.
106. See Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 505 (Minn. 1997).
107. Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 2009).
108. Id.
109. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 3, Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 746
N.W.2d 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (No. A07-0313).
110. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d. 912 (No. A070313).
111. Respondents’ Brief at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d. 912 (No. A07-0313).
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were empty of furniture and the house was strewn with boxes.
During the visit, Stephanie and Peggy were talking in the kitchen
when David, his older sister, and one of the Kincade children went
113
In the side bedroom, on a
into a side bedroom a few feet away.
carpeted floor, was a six-foot tall, three-foot wide, empty, unsecured
114
bookcase.
115
A minute or so later, the mothers heard a loud bang.
They
quickly went to the side bedroom and saw the bookcase on the
floor and two of the children standing there—but David was
116
The two mothers picked the bookcase up
nowhere to be seen.
117
He was bleeding and turning
and found David underneath it.
118
An ambulance rushed David to the hospital where he
blue.
119
He suffered
underwent several invasive surgical procedures.
serious head injuries, permanent disfiguration to the left side of his
120
face, and a possibility of future eye complications.
Peggy had not been aware of the bookcase or its unsecured
121
Although Stephanie knew that David was an active
condition.
boy, no one had ever told her about his specific propensity to climb
122
bookcases. Stephanie had not considered the bookcase a hazard
123
to her own three children.
David’s father brought an action against the Kincades in
September 2005, claiming that their negligent failure to secure the
124
bookcase caused David’s injuries. The Kincades argued that they
125
had no duty to prevent the accident in the first place.

112. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319.
113. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A070313). Notably, neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court mentioned
how close the side bedroom was in relation to where the mothers were when the
accident occurred. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319; Foss, 746 N.W.2d at 913.
114. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319.
115. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d. 912 (No. A070313).
116. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 1, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A070313).
117. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A070313).
122. Id.
123. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319.
124. Id. at 320.
125. Id.
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B. The Trial Court: No Duty Because the Danger was Open and Obvious
to Peggy Foss
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Kincades, holding that they owed no duty to secure the bookcase
because the danger was open and obvious to Peggy Foss, and the
126
accident was therefore not reasonably foreseeable.
Foss appealed.
C. Court of Appeals: No Duty Because the Accident was Not Reasonably
Foreseeable—Particularly Because of Mother’s Presence
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the
Kincades, but rejected the application of the open and obvious
127
The fact that the danger was open and obvious to
danger rule.
Peggy Foss was irrelevant; the real issue was whether the Kincades
128
owed a duty directly to David.
The court went on to make two more holdings. First, the court
of appeals held that the child trespasser standard did not apply in
this case, based on Sirek ex rel. Beaumaster v. Department of Natural
129
In Sirek, the child trespasser standard was inapplicable
Resources.
because children were not expected to be in the park
130
Because David was not expected to be in the
unsupervised.
Kincade home unsupervised, the child trespasser standard was
131
likewise inapplicable.
Second, the court of appeals held that the Kincades were not
132
The
liable because the accident was not reasonably foreseeable.
presence of Peggy Foss was central to the court’s holding, because
“the paramount duty to provide for a child’s safety rests with that
child’s parents and cannot be delegated merely by entering the
126. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 3–4, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A070313).
127. Foss, 746 N.W.2d at 913.
128. Id.
129. 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993).
130. Id. at 811.
131. Foss, 746 N.W.2d at 914–15 (“[T]he supreme court has also held that the
Restatement standard does not apply to children injured while in the company of
their parents in areas where one would not expect to find unaccompanied
children.”) (citing Sirek v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn.
1993). The court found that “at three years of age, David could not be expected
to enter the Kincades’ home on his own, nor was he of an age ‘to be allowed at
large.’” Id. (quoting Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 811).
132. Id. at 917.
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133

home of another.”
This principle was also borrowed from
134
Hence, under all the circumstances—but particularly
Sirek.
because of the presence of Peggy Foss—the court of appeals found
that the accident was just “too remote to impose liability as a matter
135
of public policy.”
Foss appealed.
D. The Supreme Court: No Duty Because It Was Not Reasonably
Foreseeable that Any Guest Would Attempt to Climb the Bookcase
The supreme court affirmed summary judgment for the
Kincades—but specifically rejected any application of Sirek or any
136
argument based on the presence of Peggy Foss.
First, the court pointed out that David was not a trespasser,
and in light of the decision in Peterson v. Balach, was owed a greater
137
“[A]lthough the child
duty than that owed to a trespasser.
trespasser standard may set the minimum standard of care,” the
court stated, “the standard of care applicable to a child injured on
138
a landowner’s premises is the general duty of reasonable care.”
Next, the court turned to the separate issue, framed with a
quotation from Peterson v. Balach, of “whether the harm to David
implicated the Kincades’ duty ‘to use reasonable care for the safety
of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless of the
139
status of the individuals.’”
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals’ use of Sirek
to limit the Kincades’ duty based on the presence of Peggy Foss.
Sirek involved a child injured in a state park—it presented issues
dealing with the state’s statutory immunity and the duty owed to a
140
Here, there was no issue of statutory immunity, and
trespasser.
141
David was not a trespasser.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 917 (quoting Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922,
924 (Minn. 1986)).
136. Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009).
137. Id. at 321 (citing Szyplinski ex rel. Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home
Supply Co., 308 Minn. 152, 155–156, 241 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1976)). But see infra
note 163.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Peterson ex rel. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199
N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972)).
140. Sirek v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993).
141. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322. Although these reasons may seem somewhat
arbitrary for not extending the basic premise that parent’s have the paramount
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The supreme court stressed that the Kincades’ duty to provide
reasonably safe premises was completely independent from Peggy
142
These duties were owed directly
Foss’s duty to supervise David.
143
Instead,
to David, and one duty could not extinguish the other.
how much each person was at fault in causing the accident was to
144
be decided under the rules of comparative negligence.
Ultimately, the supreme court held that the Kincades had no
duty to protect David from the bookshelf because it was not
145
reasonably foreseeable that anyone would attempt to climb it.
Although foreseeability is usually decided by a jury, the issue can be
decided by the court if it “is clear”—and in this case, the issue was
146
“clear.”
The court explained that reasonably foreseeable meant
“objectively reasonable to expect,” and “objectively reasonable to
expect” meant the accident was not “too remote to create
147
Therefore, the Kincades had no duty to secure the
liability.”
bookcase because expecting that guests would try to climb it was
148
Bookcases are common
“too remote to create liability.”
149
Even though a three-year-old
household items just like lamps.
child may conceivably pull a lamp onto himself and sustain injury,
the Minnesota Supreme Court would not expect a homeowner to
bolt down every lamp in her home before inviting a child in to
150
Hence, even though the Kincades knew it was possible for
visit.
the unsecured bookcase to fall over, the fact that a child might try
to climb the bookcase and thus cause it to fall over was still “too

duty to protect their children, the fact that the legislature stated liability only
existed where a trespasser could recover, and that the courts must pay total
deference to the legislature’s laws, probably account for the narrowness of the
holding in Sirek. See Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 809 (stating that under the Tort Claims
Act, users of outdoor recreation systems are defined as trespassers for tort
purposes and a child with an adult is held to general trespasser standards rather
than child trespasser standards. Therefore, in the absence of traps or hidden
dangers where trial ended the state was not liable).
142. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322.
143. Id. (citing Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 504–05
(Minn. 1997)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 322–23.
147. Id. at 322.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 323.
150. Id.
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151

remote to create liability.”
However, the court noted that it was “not difficult to imagine a
different set of facts in which a jury question as to foreseeability
152
Had the Kincades known of David’s tendency to
would arise.”
climb bookcases, they may have had a duty to secure the bookcase,
153
“or at least . . . warn Peggy Foss of its unsecured condition.”
1. Dissent of Justice Alan Page: Children Have a Well-Recognized
Propensity to Climb
Justice Page dissented, arguing that it was reasonably
foreseeable as a matter of law that David might attempt to climb
154
the bookcase.
Justice Page noted the widely recognized
155
propensity of young children to climb and intermeddle, which
156
It
had been recognized by courts in several other jurisdictions.
157
had been recognized by Internet websites discussing child safety.
It had been recognized by Justice Page himself—a father and a
158
“[T]he court is simply wrong in holding that it was
grandfather.
not ‘reasonably foreseeable that David would try to climb on the
159
bookcase.’” Justice Page argued that the case should be reversed
160
and remanded for further proceedings at the trial court level.
IV. ANALYSIS
While the supreme court’s decision in Foss v. Kincade clarifies
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 324.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Amos v. Alpha Prop. Mgmt., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 39 (Ct. App.
1999)) (“Surely anyone familiar with young children, especially two year-olds, is
aware of their propensity to climb . . .”); Orr v. First Nat’l Stores, Inc., 280 A.2d
785, 789 (Me. 1971) (observing that young children have a propensity to climb);
Dunbar ex rel. Blair v. NMM Glens Falls Assocs. LLC, 693 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (App.
Div. 1999) (noting that children’s recognized propensity to climb made injury to
child climbing on defendant’s transformer box foreseeable); Collentine ex rel.
Collentine v. City of New York, 17 N.E.2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that
children’s well-known propensity to climb factored into the determination of
foreseeability)).
157. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 324 (citing Household Safety: Preventing Injuries
From Falling, Climbing, and Grabbing, http://kidshealth.org/parent/
firstaid_safe/home/safety_falls.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009)).
158. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 324.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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the narrowness of the holding in Sirek v. Department of Natural
Resources, it clarifies little else. After explaining why Sirek is not
applicable, the court simply disposes of the case based on the
magical concept of reasonable foreseeability. The court’s fourparagraph analysis of this issue cites only one other case, and only
161
then to “define” the meaning of reasonably foreseeable. Indeed,
there is not much legal precedent to cite to when what the court is
actually doing is deciding a question of fact.
Instead of relying on clear legal principles, the court uses
broad social policy arguments to support what dicta indicates is
162
actually a very narrow holding.
This will surely cause the case to
be interpreted as standing for much more than intended. After all,
this is exactly what happened when the court used similar broad
arguments of social policy for its narrow holding in Sirek.
A. A Return to Peterson v. Balach?
The supreme court’s decision gives centralized treatment to
163
Peterson v. Balach. In fact, it gives more discussion to Peterson than
any premises liability case in recent history, and perhaps even any
164
The court even seems to
case decided in the post-Peterson era.
rely entirely on post-Peterson precedent, which is somewhat
165
remarkable among recent premises liability cases in Minnesota.
However, it is still not yet the time to break out the confetti

161. Id. at 322 (citing Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp.
U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)).
162. See id. at 323 (“It is not difficult to imagine a different set of facts in which
a jury question as to foreseeability would arise.”).
163. 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).
164. As of the date of this writing, Foss is the only case to have examined the
Peterson holding to such an extensive degree (shown by Westlaw’s “four star”
symbol, the highest level, indicating relevance and degree of discussion within the
case).
165. See discussion supra Part II.C. As a notable exception to relying on postPeterson precedent, the court cites Szyplinski ex rel. Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home
Supply Co., 308 Minn. 152, 155, 241 N.W.2d 306, 308 (1976), for the proposition
that cases decided after Peterson clarified child licensees and invitees were owed
greater care than child trespassers. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn.
2009). Although Szyplinski was decided after Peterson, its cause of action arose
before Peterson, and it was therefore decided under the old categorical rules.
Szyplinski, 308 Minn. at 155, 241 N.W.2d at 308. It is also worth noting that despite
not relying on pre-Peterson cases, most of the cases cited in Foss rest on other prePeterson limitations to liability. E.g. Barber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn.
1995).
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and declare a return to the clarity originally intended by Peterson.
A closer look reveals that the supreme court is in fact still relying
on its own conception of landowner liability, a much more
167
conservative conception, and falsely imputing it to Peterson.
B. What Foss Clearly Says: Two Points
Foss clearly holds two things: first, the threshold for liability for
injuries to child guests is reasonable foreseeability, not the child
trespasser standard; and second, a landowner’s duty to child guests
168
is not affected by the presence of a child’s parent. Both of these
points work to overturn the court of appeals’ overly-broad reading
of Sirek, and to retain the judge’s role as the ultimate gate-keeper to
169
the court.
1. The Threshold for Liability is Reasonable Foreseeability—Not the
Child Trespasser Standard of Care
Foss’s lawyers tried to argue that because David met all the
elements for recovery under the child trespasser standard, and
David was in fact entitled to an even greater duty than a trespasser,
170
The supreme
the Kincades must have owed him some duty.
court conceded that the minimum standard of care was the child
trespasser standard—but the question of whether any duty existed
at all was an entirely separate matter, and it preceded any question
171
about the standard of care.
Foss’s lawyers were apparently operating under the belief that
Peterson had created an existing duty of reasonable care solely in
172
virtue of the landowner-entrant relationship. This is what Peterson
had originally intended, but obviously that is not how the
173
Minnesota Supreme Court interprets Peterson now. The supreme
166. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
167. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
168. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009).
169. Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. App. 2008).
170. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 6–7, Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (No. A07-0313).
171. See Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 321.
172. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 7, Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn.
2009) (No. A07-0313) (“Appellant is not seeking the expansion of Minnesota tort
law. He simply seeks the ordinary application of that law, a body under which
landowners owe an entrant a duty of care to act reasonably in making their
premises safe.”).
173. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322–23.
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court even used words quoted from Peterson to frame the issue of
174
whether there was a duty in the first place —a proposition from
175
176
Barber v. Dill, not Peterson .
It is worth pointing out that inquiring into whether a
landowner owed any duty to a child guest would make no sense
under the intended view of Peterson, the Third Restatement, or even
177
Under each of these
under pre-Peterson landowner liability law.
views, the court would have assumed the Kincades owed David a
178
The main question would be whether
duty of reasonable care.
the Kincades had breached that duty—a question of fact normally
for the jury. In Foss, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
instead reaffirmed the judge’s position as the ultimate gatekeeper
to liability by retaining a separate and antecedent inquiry into the
179
existence of a duty in the first place.
2. A Landowner’s Duty to a Child Guest is Not Negated by the
Presence of the Child’s Parent
Perhaps Foss’s broadest holding is in the clarification that a
landowner’s duty to child guests is not affected by the presence of
180
This point is backed by sound reasoning.
the child’s parent.
Relieving the landowner of her duty because the child’s parent is
181
present not only smacks of contributory negligence, but also
182
imputes the negligence of the parent to the child. These are two
174. Id. at 321.
175. 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995).
176. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).
Peterson explicitly stated “the principal issue, however, will not be ‘in what category
shall we place the injured person’ but, rather, ‘did the owner (or the person
responsible) act as a reasonable person in view of the probability of injury to
persons entering upon the property’. . . .” Id.
177. See discussion supra Part II.A–B.
178. Id.
179. See discussion supra Part III.D..
180. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322.
181. Under the long abandoned doctrine of contributory negligence, plaintiffs
who had acted negligently in helping to cause their injury, no matter how slight in
comparison to the defendant, were barred from all recovery. See 4 FOWLER V.
HARPER, ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 22.1 (3d ed. 2007). The
harshness of this rule led jurisdictions to adopt comparative fault, where the
plaintiff’s recovery was only reduced by his percentage of fault in causing the
injury that as determined by the jury. Id. § 22.15. Minnesota adopted comparative
fault by statute in 1969. 1969 Minn. Laws 1069. See also MINN. STAT. § 604.01
(2009).
182. Mattson v. Minn. & N. Wis. R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 488, 104 N.W. 443, 448
(1905) (“[A child] is entitled to the protection of the law equally with persons who
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183

big “no-no’s” under contemporary torts law.
You may ask, “is it not common sense that a landowner would
be less precautious if a child was visiting with his mother as
opposed to visiting without his mother?” This may be true—but
the affect of the mother’s presence is for the jury to consider in the
context of breach or proximate cause—not for the judge to
184
consider himself in the context of duty.
The existence of a duty
is a purely legal question. Landowners owe an independent duty of
reasonable care to any child guest on their land, no matter if that
child is an orphan or accompanied by his entire extended family.
The presence of other supervising adults only affects the
circumstances—that is, the surrounding facts of the case which the
jury must evaluate to determine if the landowner acted reasonably.
Although the court of appeals had the right intentions, its
position could not work simply because it used the fact of the
parent’s presence in as a basis for denying the existence of a legal
duty. It’s reliance on Sirek was misplaced—the supreme court only
used the principle of the parents’ paramount duty to help justify
not extending the state’s liability past what the legislature had
185
Sirek did not extinguish any existing duty on
intended it to be.
have attained their majority, and to refuse him relief on the ground of his parents’
indifference or negligence would be to deny [his right] to him. To impute to him
negligence of others is harsh in the extreme, whether the negligence so imputed
be that of his parents, their servants, or his guardian.”) (overruling Fitzgerald v. St.
Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 336, 13 N.W. 168 (1882)).
183. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967)
(holding that parents’ negligence may not be imputed to her child); Peterson v.
Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712 (1958) (holding that mother’s
negligent supervision could not bar child’s recovery for injures sustained when the
child fell off a store’s ill-guarded balcony); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 5 cmt. a (2000) (“Correlatively, when a party would not be
responsible as a defendant for the negligence of a third person, the negligence of
the third person is not imputed to the party as a plaintiff. Thus, . . . [t]he
negligence of a parent is not, on that basis alone, imputed to a child.”); 4 MICHAEL
K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES §
28.15 (5th ed. 2009) (“The negligence of a parent is not imputed to the parent’s
child and will not bar a child from recovering for injuries sustained through the
negligence of a third party.”).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 8 cmt. a (2000)
(“The factfinder assigns comparative percentages of ‘responsibility’ to parties and
other relevant persons whose negligence or other legally culpable conduct was a
legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”).
185. One of the basic principles of the United States’ system of checks and
balances is that the judicial system must pay full deference to the legislature,
except in cases where it would be unconstitutional. United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84, 95 (1985). Hence, the supreme court had to be very careful not to extend
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186

the part of the state. There was no duty to begin with.
The limited use of the principle in Sirek may seem somewhat
arbitrary in light of the case it was borrowed from—Strode v.
187
Decided by the Illinois court of appeals, Strode involved a
Becker.
child guest who, while visiting a friend’s home with his father, stuck
his fingers into the rotating spokes of a common household
188
The court stated that landowners are generally
exercycle.
relieved from a duty to protect children from such obvious dangers
when the child’s parent is present—but only when the parent is
189
Hence, the
actually with the child, actively supervising him.
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Strode in order to
determine whether the father knew of the existence of the
exercycle, or was in the same room when the child stuck his fingers
190
into the exercycle’s rotating spokes.
The principle in Strode is problematic for the same reason the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ use of it in Foss was—both used the
191
argument based on the parent’s presence in the context of duty.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly pointed out, the
presence of other people is totally irrelevant to the question of
192
what the landowner’s duty to a specific entrant may be.
C.What Foss Not-So-Clearly Says: The Issue of Reasonable Foreseeability “is
Clear”
The supreme court’s ultimate determination based on the lack
of reasonable foreseeability raises more than a few eyebrows.
Reasonable foreseeability, we are told, is a question for the jury
193
unless the issue “is clear”; and where a very active, three-year-old
child, well known to the homeowner, injures himself attempting to
194
Yet, even
climb a latently tippy bookcase, the issue “is clear”.
Justice Page thinks it was reasonably foreseeable that David would
the state’s liability past what the legislature intended it to be under statutory
immunity.
186. See Sirek v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993).
187. 564 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
188. Id. at 876.
189. Id. at 880.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 880; see also Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 324 (Minn.
2009).
192. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322.
193. Id. at 323.
194. Id.
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195

try to climb the bookcase. This begs the question: what standard
is the court using to decide whether the issue “is clear?” It cannot
be the no-reasonable-jury standard required for finding no-breach
as a matter of law—unless the court wanted to imply that twelve
Justice Pages would make an unreasonable jury.
The short answer seems to be that the issue of reasonable
foreseeability “is clear” whenever the court believes that it is. In
reality, negligence issues are hardly ever so clear. By relying on the
term “is clear,” judges make it seem as if they are adhering to some
settled legal standard for determining foreseeability as a matter of
law, when in fact they are not adhering to any standard at all.
Dismissing negligence cases because the issue of reasonable
foreseeability “is clear” is really just smoke in mirrors: it sounds
warranted enough to get past most scrutiny, but really is just a cover
for judges closing the gate to the jury without articulating more
concrete reasons for doing so.
The no duty determination in Foss exemplifies why basing noduty rulings on foreseeability can be so problematic. The supreme
court was adamant about deciding the case in the context of duty,
but was also adamant about Peggy Foss’s presence being irrelevant
196
Thus, the supreme court backed itself
to the question of duty.
into a corner where it had to determine foreseeability in a makebelieve world where Peggy Foss did not exist. In other words, it had
to determine foreseeability based on a fact pattern other than the
one actually at hand.
This is exactly why judges should not use a fact-dependent
question like foreseeability to determine the abstract, legal
question of duty.
When they do so, they must either be
determining foreseeability in an intellectual vacuum, where clearly
relevant facts must be ignored, or deciding questions of fact that
are properly reserved for a jury. In most cases, it is impossible to
even tell which, if any, of the specific facts of the case the judge
took into consideration when determining foreseeability. Worst of
all, these confusing and counter-intuitive determinations become
precedent that future judges and lawyers are expected to follow.
When a case cannot be dismissed based on broad, articulated
legal rules, the issue is not clear, and a jury determination is
appropriate. Juries may be unpredictable, but their determinations

195.
196.

Id. at 324 (Page, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra Part III.D.1.
Id. at 322.
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do not create law. Furthermore, recent studies show that juries
usually reach the same conclusion in particular cases as the judge
197
One study found
would have had he decided the case himself.
that judges would have ruled the same as juries in 78% of trials,
and where the two differed, it was usually because the judge would
198
If the jury is so
have imposed liability where the jury did not.
likely to come to the same factual conclusion as a judge, why
should judges have to circumvent the jury by creating empty,
confused precedent with no-duty rulings based on the lack of
foreseeability?
199
These observations are nothing new.
These are exactly the
reasons why the Third Restatement rejects the use of no-duty
200
These are exactly the
rulings based on the lack of foreseeability.
reasons why the Minnesota Supreme Court should do so as well.
Doing so will create greater clarity and stability to Minnesota law,
while at the same time, force judges to articulate the reasoning
behind their decisions, and ultimately lend greater legitimacy to
the law.
V. CONCLUSION
No-duty rulings due to the lack of foreseeability create
precedent that is worthless at best, and downright unintelligible at
worst. The determination in Foss v. Kincade is no exception.
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision raises many more
questions than it answers: How big is the realm of reasonably
201
foreseeable harm when a three-year-old is present? Is it the same
197. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 34 (2000) (pointing out that despite
some views that the jury is a lawless threat, actual studies show juries tend to reach
the same result the judge would have reached in a particular case). See also
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1124 (1992); Michael J. Sakes, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can realty Be
Found in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221 (1998); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY
406 (1930); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998)).
198. ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT
LAW ON TRIAL 50 (2006).
199. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7(a) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
201. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. 2009). The court states
“[w]hen dealing with a three-year-old child, the realm of possible harm is much
larger than the realm of reasonably foreseeable harm.” Id. One would think that
if the realm of possible harm was so large, the realm of reasonably foreseeable
harm would also be rather large—but it does not seem this was the supreme
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size as it is for an older child, or for an adult? Will the common
tendencies of three-year-olds ever be enough to create liability?
The court indicated in dicta that the Kincades would have had
a duty if they had actual knowledge of David’s specific propensity to
202
climb bookshelves. So what if David had a tendency to pull lamps
203
If Peggy
onto himself, as the court used in another illustration?
then told Stephanie, “Hey, David has a tendency to pull lamps onto
himself,” would Stephanie have a duty to bolt down all the lamps in
her house? Would Stephanie have to warn Peggy, “Watch out—I
204
have lamps in almost every room in my home?”
Articulating an acceptable, guiding rule that would provide a
reliable answer to all of these questions would be difficult. In fact,
it may very well be impossible—but this does not mean that
drawing the invisible line of “not reasonably foreseeable” is all that
is left. In fact, there is already a specific mechanism for deciding
unclear cases just like Foss. It involves an examination of the all the
facts, done on a case-by-case basis, with input from a valid source on
societal norms. Best of all, it does not require the state’s supreme
court to create confusing, vague, and counter-intuitive precedent.
That mechanism is called the jury.

court’s position in light of the outcome reached.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Compare id. (“For example, we would not expect homeowners to bolt
down their table lamps before inviting a three-year-old into their house, even
though it is possible that such a child could be injured by pulling the lamp onto
himself.”) with id. (“[I]f the Kincades had actual knowledge that David had a
tendency to climb bookcases, the Kincades may have had a duty to secure the
bookcase or at least warn Peggy Foss of its unsecured condition.”(emphasis
added)).
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